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ABSTRACT
Three of the most important recent facts in global macroeconomics -- the sustained rise in the US
current account deficit, the stubborn decline in long run real rates, and the rise in the share of US
assets in global portfolio -- appear as anomalies from the perspective of conventional wisdom and
models. Instead, in this paper we provide a model that rationalizes these facts as an equilibrium
outcome of two observed forces: a) potential growth differentials among different regions of the
world  and,  b)  heterogeneity  in  these  regions'  capacity  to  generate  financial  assets  from  real
investments. In extensions of the basic model, we also generate exchange rate and FDI excess returns
which are broadly consistent with the recent trends in these variables. Unlike the conventional
wisdom, in the absence of a large change in (a) or (b), our model does not augur any catastrophic





















Three facts have dominated the discussion in global macroeconomics in recent times:
Fact 1: The US has run a persistent current account deﬁcit since the early 1990s, which has accelerated
dramatically since the late 1990s. Today, it exceeds US$600 billions a year. The solid dark line in Figure 1(a)
illustrates this path, as a ratio of World’s GDP (this line also includes the deﬁcits of the U.K. and Australia,
for reasons that will be apparent below, but it is overwhelmingly dominated by the U.S. pattern). The
counterpart of these deﬁcits has been driven by the surpluses in Japan and Continental Europe throughout the
period and, starting at the end of the 1990s, by the large surpluses in Asia ex-Japan, commodity producers,
and the turnaround of the current account deﬁcits in most non-European emerging market economies.
Fact 2: The long run real interest rate has been steadily declining over the last decade, despite recent eﬀorts
from central banks to raise interest rates (the “Greenspan’s Conundrum”). See Figure 1(b).
Fact 3: The importance of US assets in global portfolios has increased throughout the period and now
amounts to over 17 percent of the rest of the world’s ﬁnancial wealth, which is equivalent to 43 percent of
their annual output. See Figure 1(c).
Despite extensive debates on the factors behind and sustainability of this environment, there are very few
formal structures to analyze these joint phenomena. The conventional view and their recent formalizations,
attempt mostly to explain (the ﬁrst half of) fact 1, largely ignore fact 2, and take 3 as an exogenous anomaly.
The analysis about the future then consists of telling the story that follows once this “anomaly” goes away.
However, capital ﬂows are primarily an asset market phenomenon and hence the paths of interest rates and
portfolios must be made an integral part of the analysis if we are to conjecture on what got the world into
the current situation and how it is likely to get out of it.1
The main purpose of this paper is to provide a framework to analyze global equilibrium and, as an
important side product, shed some light on the above facts. The model is fairly standard in its ingredients
and provides a simple asset-demand and (most importantly) -supply framework to characterize the impact
of diﬀerent shocks on global capital ﬂows, interest rates and portfolios. We use this model to show that
the patterns in Figure 1 (together with observed exchange rate and gross ﬂows patterns) can arise naturally
from observed growth and ﬁnancial market shocks, which interact with heterogeneous degrees of ﬁnancial
market development in diﬀerent regions of the world.
We divide the world into three groups: The US (and “similar” economies such as Australia and the
U.K.) (U); the EuroZone/Japan (E); and the rest (R). The latter include emerging markets, oil producing
1Recently, some of the debate in policy circles also has began to highlight the role of equilibrium in global capital markets
for US current account deﬁcits. See especially Bernanke (2005) and IMF (2005). We will revisit the “saving glut” view after
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(c) Share of US Assets in Rest of the World’s Output and Financial
Wealth
Figure 1: Three Stylized Facts. Sources: (a) WDI and Deutsche Bank. (b) International Financial Statistics and Survey of
Professional Forecasters. (c) World Development Indicators, Bureau of Economic Analysis, European Central Bank, Bank of
Japan and Authors’ calculations (see appendix) 3countries, and high saving newly industrialized economies, such as Hong-Kong, Singapore and Korea. Both
U and E produce good quality ﬁnancial instruments. R, on the other hand, has high growth potential but
has episodes when it cannot generate “enough” reliable savings instruments.2
In this world, we investigate the implication of a growth slowdown in E and, primarily, a collapse in
asset markets in R. We show that both shocks point in the same direction, in terms of generating a rise in
capital ﬂows toward U, a decline in real interest rates, and an increase in the importance of U’s assets in
global portfolios. Importantly, while there are natural forces that undo some of the initial trade deﬁcits in
U, these are tenuous, as U’s current account never needs to turn into surplus and capital ﬂows indeﬁnitely
toward U.
The key feature of the model is that it focuses on the regions’ ability to supply ﬁnancial assets to savers.
Regions U and E compete on asset production. Region R demands ﬁnancial assets. Thus, fast growth in
R coupled with their inability to generate local store of value instruments increases their demand for saving
instruments from U and E. More growth potential in U than in E means that a larger share of global saving
ﬂows to U.
In the basic model productive assets are (implicitly) run by local agents and there is a single good. We
relax these assumptions in extensions. In the ﬁrst one we allow for foreign direct investment (FDI), whose
main reason is transfering “corporate governance” standards from one country to the other. In this context
FDI from U to R improves the ﬁnancial quality of assets created from investments in R, and in the process
generate rents for U. Moreover, these rents allow U to ﬁnance permanent trade deﬁcits.
In the second extension we allow for heterogeneous goods and discuss (real) exchange rate determination.
The exchange rate patterns generated by the expanded model in response to the shocks highlighted above are
broadly consistent with those observed in the data —in particular, U appreciates vis a vis both, R and E—
and anticipate a very limited and slow depreciation of U’s exchange rate in the absence of further shocks.
There are several recent articles related to the U − E analysis in our paper. For instance, Blanchard,
Giavazzi and Sa (2005) analyzes US external imbalances from the point of view of portfolio balance theory
` a la Kouri (1982). Their approach takes world interest rates as given and focuses on the dual role of the
exchange rate in allocating portfolios between imperfectly substitutable domestic and foreign assets and
relative demand through the terms of trade. In their model, the large recent US current account imbalances
result from exogenous increases in U.S. demand for foreign goods and in foreign demand for U.S. assets.
Their model predicts a substantial future depreciation of the US dollar since the exchange rate is the only
2See Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006) for a model of bubbles in emerging markets as a result of their inability to
generate reliable ﬁnancial assets. When local bubbles crash, countries need to seek store of value abroad. This pattern also
could arise from a fundamental shock due to a change in public perception of the soundness of the ﬁnancial system and local
conglomerates, degree of “cronysm,” and so on.
4equilibrating variable and current account deﬁcits must be reversed. Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2004) and (2005)
consider an adjustment process through the global reallocation of demand for traded versus non traded and
domestic versus foreign goods. Their analysis takes as given that a current account reversal needs to occur in
the US, as well as the levels of relative supply of traded and non-traded goods in each country. Because the
current account deﬁcits represents a large share of traded output, they too, predict a large real depreciation
of the dollar. These papers diﬀer from ours in terms of the shocks leading to the current “imbalances”, our
emphasis on equilibrium in global ﬁnancial markets and, most importantly, on the connection between this
equilibrium and the countries’ ability to produce sound ﬁnancial assets.
For the U − E part, the closest paper in terms of themes and some of the implications is Caballero,
Farhi and Hammour (forthcoming 2006), who present several models of speculative investments booms in U
and low global interest rates. One of the mechanisms they discuss is triggered by a slowdown in investment
opportunities in E. However the emphasis in that paper is on the investment side of the problem and
ignores the role of R and asset supply, which are central to our analysis in this paper. Kraay and Ventura
(forthcoming 2006) analyze an environment similar to that in Caballero et al.. Their emphasis is on the
allocation of excess global savings to a US bubble but it does not connect capital ﬂows to growth and
domestic ﬁnancial markets fundamentals as we do here.
For the U − R part, Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2003) and Dooley and Garber (forthcoming
2006) have argued that the current pattern of US external imbalances does not represent a threat to the
global macroeconomic environment. Their “Bretton Woods II” analysis states that the structure of capital
ﬂows is optimal from the point of view of developing countries trying to maintain a competitive exchange
rate, to develop a productive traded good sector, or to absorb large amounts of rural workers in the industrial
sector. Unlike theirs, our analysis emphasizes the role of private sector capital ﬂows and argues that the
exchange rate is mostly a sideshow.3
Section 2 is the core of the paper and presents the main model and mechanisms. Section 3 introduces a
foreign direct investment margin, while Section 4 analyzes exchange rate determination. Section 5 concludes
and is followed by several appendices.
3We do not deny the existence of large reserves accumulation by China and others. Nonetheless, we make three observations.
First, most of these reserves are indirectly held by their local private sectors through (quasi-collateralized) low-return sterilization
bonds in a context with only limited capital account openness. Second, US gross ﬂows are an order of magnitude larger than
oﬃcial ﬂows – rather than imputing Chinese reserves accumulation to ﬁnancing the US current account deﬁcit, one could
equally well (or poorly) argue that they are ﬁnancing FDI ﬂows to emerging markets, including China. Third, the role of oﬃcial
interventions was most important at a time when the US was experiencing a temporary slowdown, while our analysis refers to
more persistent trends.
52 A Model with Explicit Asset Supply Constraints
In this section we develop a stylized model that endogenizes and captures the broad patterns of capital
ﬂows, interest rates and global portfolios shown in Figure 1. The model highlights the supply side of the
market for global saving instruments. We slice the world into three groups: U-countries have deep ﬁnancial
markets and good growth conditions; E-countries have deep ﬁnancial markets but (perhaps temporarily)
bad growth conditions; ﬁnally, R-countries (perhaps temporarily) do not have deep ﬁnancial markets but
have exceptional growth conditions.
In this context we show that both the depressed growth conditions in E and the depressed ﬁnancial
markets in R compound to generate large and persistent capital ﬂows to U. Moreover, the exceptional
growth conditions in R exacerbate rather than oﬀset this pattern.4
After a series of preliminaries explaining the essence of our framework, we split the argument into three
parts. In the ﬁrst one, we study global equilibrium in a world with U and E countries only. This is the
closest to the conventional analysis and has the dual role of showing the workings of our model and studying
the equilibrium impact of a persistent decline in E’s growth conditions, as experienced by Japan from the
early 1990s and Continental Europe more recently. This decline raises capital ﬂows from E to U and lowers
global interest rates almost indeﬁnitely. That is, the automatic rebalancing forces, regardless of the extent of
home-bias, are tenuous in the absence of a reversal in the factors that led to the original imbalances, namely
depressed growth conditions in E.
In the second part we study global equilibrium in a world with U and R countries only. This is the core
of our model. We ﬁrst show that if R’s capacity to generate reliable ﬁnancial assets crashes, global interest
rates drop and capital ﬂows from R to U permanently. Moreover, if growth potential in R is above that
of the rest of the world, both eﬀects are exacerbated. In particular, long run rates decline by more than
short rates, and U can ﬁnance very signiﬁcant current account deﬁcits indeﬁnitely. That is, if the initial
asymmetry in ﬁnancial development is not undone, the automatic rebalancing forces are even more tenuous
than in the U −E world. This part primarily captures the events following the Asian and Russian crises, as
well as the fast growth and (favorably) high commodity prices experienced by much of the R region shortly
afterwards. It also captures some of the elements following the crash of the Japanese bubble in the early
1990s.
We close this section by integrating the three regions. Aside from adding the eﬀects of the previous two
parts, we show that the shock in R has a larger (favorable) impact on U than on E. The reason is that the
4Thus, the view that growth of US trading partners is on average similar to that of the US, so that diﬀerential growth cannot
be a factor in explaining the large capital ﬂows to the US, is misguided from our perspective. It matters a great deal who is
growing faster and who is growing slower than the US. If those that compete with the US in asset production grow slower and
those that demand assets grow faster, then both factors play in the same direction.
6lower interest rates resulting from the asset markets collapse in R has a larger positive eﬀect on asset values
in the region with better growth prospects.
2.1 Preliminaries
2.1.1 A closed economy
Time evolves continuously. Inﬁnitesimal agents (traders) are born at a rate θ per unit time and die at the
same rate; population mass is constant and equal to one. At birth, agents receive a perishable endowment
of (1 − δ)Xt which they save in its entirety until they die (exit). Agents consume all their accumulated
resources at the time of death. The term (1 − δ)Xt should be interpreted as the share of national output
that is not capitalizable.
The only saving vehicles are identical “trees” producing in aggregate a dividend of δXt per unit time.
Agents can save only in local trees.
By arbitrage, the instantaneous return from hoarding a unit of a tree, rt, satisﬁes:
rtVt = δXt + ˙ Vt (1)
where Vt is the value of the trees at time t. As is standard, the return on the tree equals the dividend price
ratio δXt/Vt plus the capital gain ˙ Vt/Vt.
Let Wt denote the savings accumulated by active agents at date t. Savings decrease with withdrawals
(deaths), and increase with the endowment allocated to new generations and the return on accumulated
savings:
˙ Wt = −θWt + (1 − δ)Xt + rtWt. (2)
In equilibrium, savings must be equal to the value of the trees:
Wt = Vt. (3)











5By Walras’ Law, noticing that θWt corresponds to consumption, we can re-write this relation as a goods-market equilibrium
condition:
θWt = Xt.
7Conditional on exogenous output Xt, the interest rate rises with growth because the latter lifts the rate
of growth of ﬁnancial wealth demand (W), and hence the expected capital gains from holding a tree; it
rises with δ because this increases the share of income that is capitalizable and hence it raises the supply of
assets;6 and it rises with θ because this lowers ﬁnancial wealth demand and hence asset prices.7
We assume that the total endowment in the economy, Xt, grows at rate g. Hence rt is given by raut
where
raut = g + δθ.
2.1.2 A Small Open Economy
Let us now open the (small) economy, which faces a given world interest rate, r, such that:
Assumption 1 g < r < g + θ
Deﬁnition 1 (Trade Balance and Current Account): Let us denote the trade balance and current account
at time t as TBt and CAt, respectively, with:
TBt ≡ Xt − θWt
CAt ≡ ˙ Wt − ˙ Vt
The deﬁnition of the trade balance is standard. The current account is also standard. It is the dual of
the ﬁnancial account and is deﬁned as the increase in the economy’s net asset demand.









6Given our particular parametrization, a rise in δ also lowers asset demand. This eﬀect reinforces our asset supply mechanism
but it is not robust to alternative parametrizations.
7Note that (5) diﬀers from the usual equation that would prevail if we were to adopt the standard frictionless inﬁnite
horizon consumption model. There, the interest would be determined entirely by the (asset) demand side: it would depend
only on consumption growth, the rate of time preference and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Hence, δ, which
parameterizes the supply of ﬁnancial assets, would play no role. The reason is that in the standard frictionless inﬁnite horizon
model, a reduction in δ changes the relative importance of ﬁnancial to human wealth, without changing total wealth and hence
consumption. That is, as we reduce δ, the drop in ﬁnancial savings — the demand for ﬁnancial assets— exactly oﬀsets the
drop in ﬁnancial asset supply, leaving the interest rate unaﬀected. Thus, in order to introduce an equivalent role for supply
of ﬁnancial assets in that model, we would have to introduce collateral constraints and link collateral to capitalizable income.













Figure 2: The Metzler diagram.













g + θ − r
(7)
Equation (6) is just Gordon’s formula. It shows that the asymptotic supply of assets, normalized by
the size of the economy, is a decreasing function of r. Equation (7) describes the asymptotic demand for
assets which, normalized by the size of the economy, is an increasing function of r. Figure 2 represents the
equilibrium in a supply and demand diagram, a variation on the Metzler diagram. The supply curve and
demand curve cross at r = raut.





g + θ − r
and domestic asset supply exceeds demand. Since along the balanced growth path ˙ Wt = gWt and ˙ Vt = gVt,
the above inequality implies that the small country runs an asymptotic current account deﬁcit (ﬁnanced by














(g + θ − r)(r − g)
. (8)
Note also that, asymptotically, the trade balance is in surplus: The lower rate of return on savings depresses






g + θ − r
(9)
9Importantly, however, this asymptotic trade surplus is not enough to service the accumulated net external
liabilities of the country, which is why the current account remains in deﬁcit forever.
Conversely, note that when r > raut, (8) and (9) still hold, but now the economy runs an asymptotic
current account surplus.
We can prove a stronger result that will be useful later on.


























g + θ − r
Proof. See the appendix.
2.2 A World with Symmetric (and Developed) Financial Markets (A U − E
World)
Let us now study global equilibrium with two large regions, i = {U,E}. Each of them is described by the
same setup as in the closed economy, with an instantaneous return from hoarding a unit of either tree, rt,
which is common across both regions and satisﬁes:
rtV i
t = δXi
t + ˙ V i
t (10)
where V i
t is the value of country i’s tree at time t. Let Wi
t denote the savings accumulated by active agents
in country i at date t:
˙ Wi
t = −θWi
t + (1 − δ)Xi
t + rtWi
t. (11)
Adding (10) and (11) across both regions, yields:
rtVt = δXt + ˙ Vt (12)




t , Vt = V U
t + V E
t , Xt = XU
t + XE
t .
From now on, the solution for global equilibrium proceeds exactly as in the closed economy above, with






Let us now specify the initial conditions and follow with our ﬁrst shock.
10Assumption 2 (Initial Conditions): The world is initially symmetric, with equal levels of Xi
t and a constant
rate of growth, common to both countries, g. There are no (net) capital ﬂows across the economies and
WU
t = V U
t = V E
t = WE
t .
Suppose now that, unexpectedly, at t = 0, the rate of growth of E drops permanently to
gE < g.
Lemma 2 (Continuity): At impact, r absorbs the shock while V and W remain unchanged.




It follows that Wt does not jump at t = 0 : W0− = W0+ = X0/θ. Since Wt = Vt must hold at all times, we
conclude that Vt does not jump either: V0− = V0+ = X0/θ. But for this absence of a decline in V at impact




+ δθ < r0− = g + δθ
that reﬂects a decline in world output growth.8
While global wealth and capitalization values do not change at impact, the allocation of these across
economies does. On one hand, it stands to reason that the lower growth in XE
t implies that V U
0 /V E
0 must
rise since both dividend streams are discounted at the common global interest rate. On the other, whether
WU
0 /WE
0 rises or not depends on the agents’ initial portfolio allocations. However, as long as there is some
home bias in these portfolios, WU
0 /WE
0 rises as well. Because the conventional view has taken the well
established fact of home bias as a key force bringing about rebalancing of portfolios, we shall assume it as
well, as this isolates the contribution of our mechanisms more starkly. Moreover, for clarity, in the main
propositions we assume an extreme form of home bias, but then extend the simulations and ﬁgures to other
cases.
Assumption 3 (Home Bias). Agents ﬁrst satisfy their saving needs with local assets and only hold foreign
assets once they run out of local assets.


















8According to the World Development Indicators, average output growth for U, E and R was 3.41% in the 1980s, 2.77% in
the 1990s and 2.75% since 2000.
11These changes in wealth have a direct impact on consumption, which are reﬂected immediately in the trade
balance and current account.
Before describing these eﬀects, let us digress momentarily. At times, it will be convenient for exposition
to note that the current account can also be written as the sum of trade balance and net income from global
holdings:





















where i  = j, α
i,j
t is the share of country j’s trees held by agents in country i, α
j,i
t is the share of country i’s
trees held by agents in country j.
Proof. See the appendix.
Note that our current account deﬁnition excludes, as does national accounts, unexpected valuation eﬀects
(unexpected capital gains and losses from international positions). This is not a relevant issue for now since
the only surprise takes place at date 0, when agents are not holding international assets. We shall return to
this issue when relevant.
Also note that since CAE
t +CAU
t = 0, we only need to describe one of the current accounts to characterize
both. Henceforth, we shall describe the behavior of CAU
t , with the understanding that this concept describes
features of the global equilibrium rather than U-speciﬁc features.
Finally, without any substantive implication (see the Appendix for the general case), we make an as-
sumption to narrow the asymptotic cases we need to analyze:
Assumption 4 (Bounded Growth Decline): (g − gE) < (1 − δ)θ.
Proposition 1 (Persistent Current Account Deﬁcits in U): Under assumptions 1 to 4, an unexpected and
persistent decline in E’s rate of growth from g to gE < g, turns CAU
t into a deﬁcit at impact and remains
in deﬁcit in the long run (although vanishing asymptotically relative to XU
t ).
Proof. At impact, we have
WU





0 − θV U
0+ < 0
For t > 0, using θWt = Xt and θVt = Xt we have
CAU
t = ˙ WU
t − ˙ V U
t = ˙ V E
t − ˙ WE
t
12From equation (15) and g > gE, limt→∞ rt = rU







































Finally, it follows immediately from g > gE that CAU
t /XU
t vanishes asymptotically.
The impact eﬀect of a decline in E’s rate of growth is a decline in the value of E’s assets which drags
down E’s wealth one for one given the extreme home bias assumption. This leads to an immediate drop in
E’s consumption which is not matched by a drop in E’s current income. Thus E’s trade balance, which is
equal to the current account in the symmetric initial equilibrium, goes into surplus. In equilibrium, U has
to absorb this surplus by running a trade deﬁcit. The latter is achieved by an increase in U’s consumption,
which results from an increase in U’s wealth following the appreciation of U’s assets. This appreciation does
not stem from any increase in U’s growth prospects, but from the fall in interest rates brought about by E’s
slowdown.
Suddenly U’s assets look relatively more attractive, and hence a share of E’s saving begins to ﬂow to
these assets. Over time, the return on these assets raises E’s wealth and consumption (relative to output),
eventually overturning the initial trade surplus, and hence U’ s trade deﬁcit.
However, U’s eventual trade surpluses are never enough to service the accumulated net-foreign liabilities
in full, and hence U’s current account remains in deﬁcit forever. The counterpart of this persistent deﬁcit
is a sustained accumulation of U’s assets by E. This accumulation is very fast early on, as the relative
importance of U assets in E’s portfolio rises until it converges (asymptotically) to:
g − gE
((1 − δ)θ − (g − gE))((g − gE) + δθ)
> 0.
Thus, in the limit, E continuously accumulates U’s assets at a rate gE.
Of course, this does not mean that our model violates the intertemporal approach to the current account.
Integrating forward the equation:
˙ WU




t − V U
t )
we ﬁnd the usual expression:
WU





























Since the initial net asset position is balanced in our basic scenario, the net present value of trade balance
surpluses is zero. The trade balance TBU













gE + θ − rU
aut
> 0.
Importantly, however, increased net interest payments to E due to U’s accumulation of net foreign liabilities
exceed the trade balance surpluses and generate a chronic current account deﬁcit in U.
We can understand the asymptotic result in the proposition with reference to the simple small open
economy in Section 2.1, and its Figure 2. First, since in the long run U dominates the global economy, the
equilibrium interest rate converges to the Autarky interest rate for U:
r∞ = rU
aut = g + δθ.
Thus the gap between WU
t /XU
t and V U
t /XU
t is asymptotically vanishing. However, note that the limit
interest rate exceeds the new Autarky rate in E:
r∞ = g + δθ > gE + δθ = rE
aut.
Thus the asymptotic gap between WE
t /XE
t and V E
t /XE
t is strictly positive. Moreover, by global equilibrium
this means that the asymptotic gap between WU
t /XE
t and V U
t /XE
t is strictly negative.
Let us now turn to a characterization of the entire path. Figure 3 portrays an example of the impact of
a growth slowdown for parameters calibrated to match some key aspects of the data.9 Our only goal here is
to consolidate the insights from the proposition and to argue that the eﬀects we describe are quantitatively
signiﬁcant. We do not attempt to match the exact paths in the data, as that would require additional
smoothing mechanisms, such as gradual globalization, and other adjustment costs. Absent these, adjustments
are too large at impact and too fast. Still, note that even in this frictionless environment, adjustments are
gradual and capital ﬂows remain large many years after the shock. Also note that the cumulative results,
which are more robust to the absence of frictions, are large
Panel A of Figure 3 shows that U’s current account/GDP exhibits large initial deﬁcits of 17 percent
of output, which converge to zero only gradually. Panel B reports U’s net external position. The growth
shock lowers V E relative to V U. Since in order to match Figure 1(c), we calibrated U’s assets share in
initial global portfolio to 5% (rather than the 0% in the proposition), U suﬀers a small initial valuation
loss.10 More centrally, the large initial current account deﬁcits worsen rapidly U’s net foreign asset position
9See the appendix for a discussion of the calibration. The drop in E’s growth rate is about one percent.
10That is, the initial jump at t = 0+ reﬂects the unexpected valuation eﬀect from U’s holdings of E’s asset. Recall that our
convention, similar to NIPA or BoP accounting, excludes these valuation eﬀects from the current account.
14Figure 3: A Collapse in gE
from zero to -75 percent in 15 years. Eventually, the net foreign asset position converges to zero (relative to
domestic output), but panel B illustrates that this convergence is slow, and in fact comes entirely from the
denominator (output growth) since U never runs a current account surplus. Given our parameter values, the
initial real interest rate equals 6 percent. Panel C shows that it drops by about 60 basis points at impact,
then climbs back very slowly to pre-shock levels. Finally, the last panel shows the share of U’s assets in E’s
wealth, under the assumption that U maintains its initial holdings. This portfolio share increases rapidly
from 5 percent to 25 percent, and asymptotes to 34 percent.
The model is thus able to generate simultaneously large and long lasting current account deﬁcits in U
(Fact 1); a decline in real interest rates (Fact 2) and an increase in U’s share in the global portfolio (Fact 3).
Up to now, diﬀerential growth limited the aggregate ability to create valuable assets in E relative to
U. But there are other factors that create comparative advantage in asset creation, such as institutional
diﬀerences, ranging from corporate governance to transparency of the ﬁnancial system and policymaking.
We turn to this analysis next, which is at the core of our explanation for recent global imbalances.
2.3 A World with Asymmetric Financial Markets (a U− R World)
Let us now turn to the interaction between U and R. For clarity, we shall remove E from the analysis for
now. The key element of this part of the model is that R is able to grow and generate income for savers but
15is limited in its ability to generate sound ﬁnancial assets for these savers.
In this section we develop our argument in two steps: First, at date 0 we let R’s δ drop from δ to δ
R < δ,
in an environment where R and U are growing at the same rate g. Second, we repeat the experiment but
now in an environment where R is growing faster than U, gR > g.
How should we interpret a drop in δ
R? In general, as the realization that local ﬁnancial instruments are
less sound than they were once perceived to be. This could result from, inter alia, a crash in a bubble; the
realization that corporate governance is less benign than once thought; a signiﬁcant loss of informed and
intermediation capital; the sudden perception —justiﬁed or not— of “crony capitalism”; a sharp decline
in property rights protection, and so on. All of these factors -and more- were mentioned in the events
surrounding the Asian/Russian crises (e.g. Fischer (1998)).
The formulae are very similar to that in the U − E model, but there are some diﬀerences that need to
be highlighted. Let quantities without superscript denote world aggregates (now made of U and R, rather
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R)Xt + ˙ Vt
with xU
t ≡ XU
t /Xt. Similarly, we have that:
˙ WR
t = (1 − δ
R)XR









Xt + (rt − θ)Wt
Finally, using the equilibrium conditions W = V = X/θ, and the arbitrage equation for V , we can solve for
the equilibrium interest rate as before:
rt = xU
t (g + δθ) + (1 − xU
t )(g + δ
Rθ) (16)
= rU
aut − (1 − xU
t )(δ − δ
R)θ. (17)
Proposition 2 (Crash in R’s Financial Markets with Symmetric Growth): Assume R and U grow at the
same rate g. Under Assumption 3, if δ drops in R to δ
R < δ , then the current account of U turns into a
deﬁcit at impact and remains in deﬁcit thereafter, with CAU
t /XU
t converging to a strictly negative constant.
The interest rate falls permanently below rU
aut.
Proof. Note ﬁrst that since both regions are growing at the same rate, xU
t = xU
0 for all t > 0, and the
interest rate remains constant after dropping at date 0:
16rt = r+ = rU
aut − (1 − xU
0 )(δ − δ
R)θ < rU
aut. (18)














Let us now describe the balanced growth path and then return to describe transitory dynamics. In the



















(g + θ − r+)(r+ − g)
< 0.





t = (r+ − g − θ)wR
t + (1 − δ
R).
with a balanced growth equilibrium value of (1 − δ
R)/(θ + g − r+).










θ + g − r+
since r+ < rU
aut. That is, wR
t is below its balanced growth path at t = 0+.
Since r+ < rU
aut < g + θ, we must have ˙ wR
t > 0 when wR




Thus we also have that U’s current account CAU
t = ˙ V R
t − ˙ WR
t is in deﬁcit – in fact, a larger deﬁcit– before
converging to its new balanced growth path.
That is, now even if both regions have similar rates of growth, U runs a permanent current account
deﬁcit. The latter is the counterpart of the increasing ﬂow of resources from R-savers, who have few reliable
local assets to store value and hence must resort to U-assets. In balanced growth, R-savings grow at the rate
of growth of income. If R-savings are below (output-detrended) steady state, then the rate of accumulation
exceeds the rate of growth of the economy and capital ﬂows toward U grow at a fast rate (faster than g).
The collapse in δ
R decreases the global supply of assets by reducing the share of R’s income that can
be capitalized. As before, the shock is entirely absorbed via a decline in world interest rates, reﬂecting a
decline in the global dividend rate from δ to δ−(1 − x0)(δ−δ
R). While global wealth and capitalization do

























NAR = −NAU > 0
D∗




0 must rise as an unchanged stream of U’s dividends is now discounted at a lower interest rate.
Correspondingly, under our home bias assumption, the ratio WU
0 /WR
0 must also rise.11
Again, we can resort to the analysis of a small open economy in Section 2.1, and its Figure 2, to understand
the asymptotic result. For this, note that the equilibrium interest rate falls to a level in between the two
ex-post Autarky rates:
rU
aut = g + δθ > r+ = g + δθ − (1 − xU
0 )(δ − δ
R)θ > g + δ
Rθ = rR
aut
Thus the gap between WU
t /XU
t and V U
t /XU
t is negative and non-vanishing (see Lemma 1). Or, from the
other region’s perspective, the gap between WR
t /XR
t and V R
t /XR
t is positive and non-vanishing. Figure 4
presents the asymptotic result. Starting from a symmetric equilibrium at A and A∗ with a world interest
rate rU
aut, the decline in δ
R shifts the V R/XR curve to the left (decline in asset supply) and the WR/XR
curve to the right (increase in asset demand). The world interest rate declines just enough so that the net
foreign assets in U (NAU ≡ WU −V U < 0) and the net foreign assets in R (NAR ≡ WR −V R > 0) sum to
zero.
Figure 5 characterizes the entire path following a collapse of δ
R calibrated so that R’s asset prices drop
by 50% on impact (see the appendix for a discussion). Again, our objective is not to match the precise
trajectory of the US current account following the Asian crisis, but to argue that the eﬀects we describe are
quantitatively signiﬁcant. Panel A of Figure 5 shows that U’s current accounts exhibit large initial deﬁcits
of 20 percent. The current account remains negative and asymptotes at -2.8 percent of output. As in the
U − E case, the large initial current account deﬁcits worsen rapidly the net foreign asset position from -6
11It is easy to show that if δR crashes to zero, then a bubble must arise in U-trees. While that drop in δR is extreme, it
captures the ﬂavor of the behavior of U’s asset markets in recent years. In the less extreme version we have highlighted, we still
capture this ﬂavor through the rise in the value of U’s fundamentals following the decline in equilibrium interest rates.
18Figure 5: A Collapse in δ
R
percent at impact to -95 percent (panel B). The real interest rate drops by slightly more than 50 basis points
and remains permanently lower. Finally, U’s share in R’s portfolio increases gradually from 11 percent
(immediately after the shock) to 55 percent.12
Once again, the model is able to generate, simultaneously, large and long lasting current account deﬁcits













(θ + g − r+)(r+ − g)
< 0.
The reason is that excess savings needs in R grow with R’s output, which grows in tandem with U’s output.
Note also that the size of the permanent current account deﬁcit in U (relative to output) is increasing
in the relative size of R (equal to (1 − xU
0 )). This observation hints at an important additional source of
large and persistent deﬁcits in U. In practice, R’s rate of growth exceeds that of U, and hence the relative
importance of this source of funding of U-deﬁcits rises over time — both, because of diﬀerential growth and
because many R countries are gradually globalizing.
Let us now turn to our second experiment and explore the eﬀect of a crash in δ
R that takes place in an
12The initial jump from 5 to 11 percent reﬂects the drop in R’s wealth and jump in V U at t = 0+.
19environment where:
gR > g.
The instantaneous interest rate in this case is:
rt = xU
t (g + δθ) + (1 − xU
t )(gR + δ
Rθ). (19)
Let us assume that the additonal growth in R is not enough to oﬀset the eﬀect of a lower δ
R on interest
rates:
Assumption 5 (Lower ex-post autarky rate in R) rR
aut = gR + θδ
R < rU
aut − θ(1 − xU
0 )(δ − δ
R) < rU
aut
Proposition 3 (Crash in R’s Financial Markets with High Growth in R) Suppose that Assumptions 3 and
5 hold, but that gR > g. If at date 0 δ drops to δ
R in R, then:
rU
aut = r0− > r0+ > r∞ = rR
aut



















Proof. See the appendix.
The result in this proposition is intuitive given the previous proposition: As R’s growth rises, so does
its demand for ﬁnancial assets. Since this rise is not matched by an increase in R’s ability to generate
ﬁnancial assets, these assets must be found in U and interest rates drop as the price of U-assets rise. The
corresponding increase in capital ﬂows ﬁnances the larger current account deﬁcit in U. Long run interest
rates fall more than the short term interest rates because the relative importance of the country with excess
demand for assets, R, rises over time.
As before, let us now describe the asymptotic result in terms of Figure 2, from Section 2.1. First, since
in the long run R dominates the global economy when gR > g, the equilibrium interest rate converges to the
Autarky interest rate for R:
r∞ = rR
aut = gR + δ
Rθ.
Thus, relative to XR
t , the gap between WR
t and V R
t is vanishing, and so is that between WU
t and V U
t .
However, note that this limit interest rate is below the Autarky rate in U:
r∞ = gR + δ
Rθ < g + δθ = rU
aut.
Thus, relative to XU
t , the gap between WU
t and V U
t is negative and not vanishing. Moreover, since
r∞ < r+ < rU
aut,
that gap is larger when gR > g than when gR = g.
202.4 The Three Regions World (U − E − R)
In this section, we consider a U − E − R environment. Much of this world is simply the sum of the two
sub-worlds described above, but there is one additional insight: If the crash in δ
R takes place when gU > gE,
then the asset appreciation in U is (much) larger than that in E, and the bulk of the capital ﬂows from R
are directed to U rather than to E.
Since the dynamic equations follow directly from those discussed above, we relegate them to the ap-
pendix and state the main proposition directly, after making an assumption on the parameter region under
consideration:
Assumption 6 rR
aut ≡ gR + δ
Rθ < rU
aut ≡ g + δθ, rR
aut < gE + θ, gE < g.
Proposition 4 (Disproportionate Flows toward U) If Assumption 6 holds, then a crash in δ
R leads to an























Proof. See the appendix.
In words, the reduction in world interest rates stemming from the crash in δ
R has a larger impact on
U-assets since these are more leveraged than E-assets when g > gE. This diﬀerence can be quite large. For
a decline in δ
R calibrated so that V R collapses by 50 percent on impact, with g = gR and a 1.1 percent
growth diﬀerential g − gE, the ratio of asset price elasticities equals 1.43.
Figure 6 traces the entire path in the case where g = gR. We start the economy in a symmetric equilibrium
(gi = g and δ
i = δ), with xU
0 = xE
0 = 0.425 and xR
0 = 0.15. We then reduce E’s growth at t = 0. This
reduces world interest rates to 5.5 % and increases asset values in R and U as both regions receive capital
inﬂows (panel D). Then, at t = 5, we decrease δ
R. Panel D illustrates that the collapse in δ
R and V R
disproportionately aﬀects V U relative to V E: V U increases by 12 percent at t = 5, compared to 8 percent
for V E. This results in much larger current account deﬁcits in U relative to E and an additional build-up
in net liabilities in U (panel A).
3 Foreign Direct Investment, Excess Returns, and Persistent Trade
Deﬁcits
Let us now add an investment margin to the U −R model and a reason for foreign direct investment (FDI).
We capture the former with the emergence of options to plant new trees over time, and the latter with U’s
21Figure 6: A Collapse in gE followed by a collapse in δ
R in the U-E-R model
ability to convert new R trees into δ (rather than δ
R) trees.13 The intermediation rents from FDI reduce
the trade surpluses that U needs to generate to repay for its persistent early deﬁcits. In fact, we show a
stronger result: As long as there are no FDI obstacles (in the sense that all investment can be done by U)
and there is any rent for U’s intermediation service, U will run permanent trade deﬁcits.14
3.1 An Investment Margin





13Note that in a three regions version of the model E also could convert R trees. Although in this case, a good question is
which rate of growth would the output of those trees have.
14The view here is not unrelated to that in Despres, Kindleberger and Salant (1966) and Kindleberger (1965), who during
the Bretton Woods era argued that the US had a unique role as a provider of international currency liquidity. More recently,
Gourinchas and Rey (forthcoming 2006) have documented that the total return on US gross assets (mostly equity and FDI)
consistently exceeded the total return on gross liabilities (mostly safe instruments) by an average of 3.32 percent per year since
1973. Of course part of this excess return is due to the risk-premium diﬀerential associated to the leveraged nature of US
investments. Our analysis omits this risk dimension and focus on the “intermediation” rent obtained by the US.
Everything suggests that this “intermediation” role of the US has only grown in importance as total gross capital ﬂows
to/from the US have risen from $222 billion in 1990 to $2.3 trillion in 2004 (see BEA, US International Transactions Accounts,
Table 1). See also Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (forthcoming 2006) for a systematic analysis of cross border ﬂows and positions for
a large sample of countries.
22At each point in time, gnNi
t options to plant new trees arise. At the same time, the output of each planted
tree grows at the rate gz. Planting the gnNi





We shall assume that κ is low enough so that all investment options are exercised (see below), and hence
aggregate output grows at rate g, with (equal for both regions):
g = gn + gz.
Suppose ﬁrst that δ




t + ˙ V i
t − gnV i
t (20)
where V i
t represents the value of all (new and old) trees planted at time t in region i, and ˙ V i
t −gnV i
t represents
the expected capital gains from those trees.
The options to invest are allocated to all those alive at time t within each region, who immediately
exercise them by investing Ii
t.15 Thus,
˙ Wi
t = (rt − θ)Wi
t + (1 − δ
i)Xi
t + gnV i
t − Ii
t.
As usual, aggregating across both regions to ﬁnd the equilibrium interest rate, yields:
rtVt = δXt − (δ − δ
R)XR
t + ˙ Vt − gnVt (21)
˙ Wt = (rt − θ)Wt + (1 − δ)Xt + (δ − δ
R)XR
t + gnVt − It (22)
so that:





r = gz +
θ
1 − κ
(δ − (δ − δ
R) xR) < rU




which amounts to the same model as in the previous section, with the exceptions that only the rate of growth
of output per-tree enters, and that the investment cost reduces wealth accumulation and hence raises the
interest rate (since it lowers the price of trees).
15Note that the share of options that are allocated to existing owners of trees are subsumed within the Z component. In fact,
we can reinterpret the model in Section 2 as an investment model where all the options are allocated to the owners of existing
trees. The only reason we modiﬁed the allocation of options in this section is to spread the excess returns from FDI over time
in a more realistic manner (otherwise the entire capitalized excess returns accrues to the ﬁrst generation in U).
233.2 An Intermediation Margin: Foreign Direct Investment




t denotes the output from the trees sold to U. We think of this price as the result of some bargaining
process but its particular value is not central for our substantive message as long as it leaves some surplus
to U.
There are gains from trade: If U residents plant the new R trees, the share of output from the new trees
that can be capitalized rises from δ
R to δ. Suppose that Pt is such that all new R trees are planted by U
residents. In fact, the following assumption ensures that U investors and R sellers gain from foreign direct
investment along the entire path.
Assumption 7 (Asymptotic Bilateral Private Gains from FDI) Let κP and (δ − δ
R) be such that:
gn δ
raut − gz > κ + κP > gn δ
R
raut − gz
Proposition 5 If Assumption 7 holds, then U runs an asymptotic trade deﬁcit ﬁnanced by its intermediation
rents.
Proof. Let us assume that enough time has passed so that the output of the old R trees is negligible
relative to the total output produced by trees planted in R by U. We have:
(rt + gn)V i
t = δXi
t + ˙ V i
t
(rt + gn)Vt = δXt + ˙ Vt
˙ WU
t = (rt − θ)WU
t + (1 − δ)XU
t + gnVt − (IU
t + IR
t ) − Pt.
˙ WR
t = (rt − θ)WR
t + (1 − δ)XR
t + Pt.
˙ Wt = (rt − θ)Wt + (1 − δ)Xt + gnVt − It (24)
so that:















(1 − δ − κ) + gn δ
raut−gz + gn δx
R/x
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raut−gz − (κ + κP)xR/xU











(1 − δ − κ) + gn δ
raut−gz + gn δx
R/x
U
raut−gz − (κ + κP)xR/xU





raut−gz − (κ + κP)
θ + g − raut
< 0.
That is, the trade balance is in deﬁcit in the long run as long as there is an intermediation rent, which is
ensured by Assumption 7.
Does this mean that the intertemporal approach of the current account has been violated? Certainly
not. It simply means that the intermediation rents rather than future trade surpluses pay for the initial
(and now permanent) trade deﬁcits. Alternatively, one could account for these intermediation services as




t + gnV R
t − (κ + κP)XR
t
and, assuming raut > g so the integral converges, it follows that:
WU









Figure 7 reports the path of U’s trade balance following a collapse in δ
R.16 We consider three cases:
ﬁrst, when κP is suﬃciently high that no FDI takes place. Second, when all the rents asymptotically go to
R (i.e. when the second inequality of assumption 7 holds exactly) and lastly when all the rents from FDI
asymptotically go to U (i.e. when the ﬁrst inequality of assumption 7 holds exactly).17 The model without
FDI is very similar to the model of section 2.3: following a collapse in δ
R, the interest rate falls permanently
from raut to ¯ r = gz+¯ δθ/(1 − κ) where ¯ δ is the fraction of world income that can be capitalized. By now, the
consequences are well known: the wealth transfer to U generates a trade deﬁcit, an accumulation of foreign
debt, eventually followed by trade surpluses (panel D).
In the presence of FDI, the results are starkly diﬀerent. Let’s start with the long run. The asymptotic
eﬀect of FDI is to increase the supply of U-like assets suﬃciently to oﬀset the initial shock. This has a strong
implication for the path of net foreign assets (panel B): since rt converges to raut as long as FDI takes place
(Panel C), the Metzler diagram tells us that long run external imbalances disappear asymptotically. This is
independent of the cost of ownership of the R trees (κP) as long as Assumption 7 is satisﬁed. The reason is
that κP controls the distribution of wealth between U and R, leaving total wealth unchanged.
16We calibrate the decline in δR as before, to a drop in V R of 50%. See the appendix for details of the simulation.
17For this simulation, we assume κ = 0, gn = g = 0.03, gz = 0 and we vary κP between 5% and 12%. For comparability, we
also choose δ so that raut = 6%. We obtain δ = 0.24.
25Figure 7: A Collapse in δ
R with and without FDI
Consider the short run now. The interest rate satisﬁes:18























t ) denote the new (resp. old) R’s trees share of world output and vRn
t (resp. vRo
t )
represent the value of one new (resp. old) R tree. The last term of this equation makes clear that initially
rt < ¯ r since vRn
0 > vRo
0 and xRn
0 = 0. The reason for this last term is the initial rapid increase in U’s asset







In the short run, FDI increases asset demand -which lowers further interest rates; in the long run, it
increases asset supply, which brings interest rates back to raut.
From (20) and (26) we note also that the dynamics of interest rates and asset values are independent of
κP (as long as FDI takes place). Hence, the initial increase in U’s wealth is also independent of the cost
of FDI. It follows that U’s initial trade imbalance (equal to XU
0 − θWU
0 − IU
0 ) is also independent of κP.
Indeed, we observe on Panels A and D that U’s initial current accounts and trade deﬁcits are the same for
diﬀerent realizations of κP.
A lower value of κP (higher rents for U) implies a permanently larger trade deﬁcit in U, ranging from 0
to 4% of output (Panel D).
18See the appendix for a derivation.
26To understand why U runs asymptotic trade deﬁcits as soon as it has strictly positive asymptotic sur-
pluses, consider ﬁrst the case where U has no FDI rents asymptotically. In that case, U has no asymptotic
trade deﬁcit either. Yet, Panel D indicates that U never runs a trade surplus. The reason is that U earns
rents on its FDI investment along the path, which allow it to run trade deﬁcits in every period. In fact, we




















which is equal to zero when the ﬁrst inequality of assumption 7 holds exactly.
We can now understand why U can run permanent trade deﬁcits: When Assumption 7 holds strictly,
intermediation rents remain strictly positive and provide the resources to ﬁnance permanent trade deﬁcits.
4 Multiple Goods and Exchange Rates
Up to now, our conclusions have abstracted from (real) exchange rate considerations. However, the main
point of this section is to show that adding such dimension to the model does not alter the qualitative (and in
some cases quantitative) features of the results. While adding multiple goods allows us to generate exchange
rate patterns from our shocks that resemble those observed in recent data —in particular, U appreciates vis
a vis both, R and (to a lesser extent) E, when asset markets collapse in R— the behavior of capital ﬂows
and interest rates remain largely unchanged with the exception of some attenuation in the U − E context
and ampliﬁcation in some U − R cases.
4.1 Preliminaries
Let us return to the framework in Section 2, without an investment margin, but extend it to consider
diﬀerentiated goods. Each country i produces one type of good Xi, while its consumers have the following

















where σ represents the –constant– elasticity of substitution between the goods from any two countries. The
coeﬃcients γij measure the strength of preferences for the various goods and satisfy
 
j γij = 1. Assumption
8 below imposes that agents have a preference for their home good. This assumption is well-established
empirically. It also generates relative demand eﬀects that will be important for exchange rate dynamics.
27Assumption 8 (Consumption Home Bias) Each agent has a preference for the home good: γii ≡ γ > 0.5.
Let XU be the numeraire good and deﬁne qj as the price of good j in terms of good U (with the convention




















This expression highlights the importance of consumption home bias for exchange rate movements: if γij =
γkj for all j, then purchasing power parity obtains and the real exchange rate is equal to 1.







and equilibrium in the goods market imposes
 
i
xij = Xj, ∀j.
Substituting PiCi = θWi (where domestic wealth is now measured in terms of U’s good), the equilibrium












4.2 A U − E World
We now specialize the model to a symmetric U − E world, and denote by rt the instantaneous return in




t + ˙ V i
t
while wealth dynamics follow
˙ Wi
t = (1 − δ)qi
tXi
t + (rt − θ)Wi
t.
As before, adding across countries and using the equality between global wealth and global asset values, one
obtains:
Wt = Vt =
Xt
θ









The only notable diﬀerence is that the (inverse of the) terms of trade qE
t –and hence the real exchange
rate– enters into the determination of global wealth and of the equilibrium interest rate via Xt.
In turn, the terms of trade are determined by the equilibrium on the market for XU (by Walras’ Law,









Let Assumptions 2 and 3 hold, so that the world is initially symmetric with a common rate of growth g,
and there is extreme portfolio home bias. Given the symmetry assumption, it is immediate that qE = 1, so
that the interest rate satisﬁes:
r = g + δθ
while asset values and wealth satisfy




As before, suppose that at t = 0 the growth rate of E drops unexpectedly and permanently to:
gE < g.
The main initial diﬀerence with Section 2 is that now both the interest rate and the real exchange rate
absorb the shock at impact. To see this, observe that the decline in gE decreases E’s asset values. With
Assumption 3 (extreme home portfolio bias), this impoverishes E’s residents. Given the consumption-home-
bias assumption (Assumption 8), the associated decline in E’s consumption falls mostly on the demand for
E goods. Equilibrium in the goods markets then requires that qE falls. This relative demand eﬀect implies
that U’s real exchange rate appreciates at impact. It is a direct consequence of both home consumption and
portfolio biases. Over time, however, the increase in the relative supply of U’s good requires that its real
exchange rate depreciates.
How large is the initial fall and eventual increase in qE depends on the elasticity of substitution σ. To
see this, observe that the relative demands satisfy
xiE
xiU ∝ (qE)−σ
Asymptotically, the ratio of relative demands for at least one country must equal the ratio of relative supply,










29Let us rule out the region σ < 1 since it implies immiserizing growth. In the feasible region, consider ﬁrst
the σ = 1 case which yields the starkest departure from the previous section. Given the initial symmetry













In this extreme case, when growth slows down in E there is no change in the exchange rate at impact,
and a gradual increase in q at rate (g−gE) thereafter. Since the output share is constant, the instantaneous












+ δθ = g + δθ.








Hence neither country needs to run current account imbalances in response to the collapse in gE. The reason
is that the terms of trade oﬀset perfectly the relative decline in output growth, leaving relative wealth
and relative output unchanged (when measured in the same units). Log preferences eliminate the model’s
dynamics!19
Consider now the more realistic case where σ > 1. From the previous discussion, we infer that qE increases
at a smaller rate than the growth diﬀerential. For instance, with σ = 4 —not an unreasonable value20— and
a growth diﬀerential of 1 percent per year, the model implies that U’s terms of trade would worsen at 0.25
percent per year. This implies an even slower real exchange rate depreciation, which eventually converges
to a steady state value of ((1 − γ)/γ)
1/(1−σ) .
We can prove a result similar to Proposition 1 and the associated Metzler diagram in presence of exchange











t tends to 1, we obtain:
lim
t→∞




t = (rt − θ)WE





t + ˙ V E
t
19This well-known result was ﬁrst shown by Cole and Obstfeld (1991).
20See later in this section for a discussion of the calibration of σ.






























Thus, the asymptotic wealth and asset values are similar to those of Proposition 1, the only diﬀerence being
that gE has to be replaced by gE + 1
σ(g − gE) < gU.





































As we discussed above, when σ = 1 there is no current account deﬁcit. At the other extreme, when σ
tends to inﬁnity we recover the deﬁcits from Proposition 1 since there is no oﬀsetting long-run exchange
rate movement. While there can be non-monotonicities in the intermediate region, the general message is
apparent: The possibility of long-run exchange rate movements attenuates rather than exacerbates the
wealth eﬀects associated with diﬀerential growth and hence attenuates asymptotic current account deﬁcits.
The main reason behind the latter is that the reduced wealth eﬀects at impact when σ < ∞ leads to smaller
initial trade deﬁcits in U and hence smaller accumulated net external liabilities.
Figure 8 presents a simulation of a decline in gE in the two-goods model when σ = 4 and γ = 0.9.21 It
conﬁrms our conclusions from the one-good model –see Figure 3.
Comparing panels A-D in both ﬁgures, we observe that relative price movements limit the size of the
current account deﬁcit (Panel A, 8.2 percent versus 17 percent in the single good model) and limit accordingly
the build-up in net foreign debt (Panel B, -57 percent after 24 years versus -75 percent of output after 15
years in the single good model). Accordingly, the increase in the share of U in global portfolios is more muted
(Panel D). Panel C reports the world’s real instantaneous rates of return, deﬁned as the output-weighted
average of both countries real returns. The trajectory of the world real interest rates is very similar to the
one obtained in panel C in ﬁgure 3: from 6 percent, the world interest rate drops to 5.41 percent on impact,
then climbs very slowly back toward 6 percent. Finally, Panel E reports the real exchange rate λ = PE/PU.
On impact λ appreciates by about 7.8 percent, then gradually but persistently depreciates. Importantly, in
our model it is the latter eﬀect that dominates (dampens) wealth eﬀects and hence limits the initial current
account deﬁcits in U.
21Feenstra (1994) ﬁnds a value of 4 for σ while Broda and Weinstein (2004) report estimates ranging from 17 at 7-digit
between 1972-1988 to 4 for 3-digit goods in 1990-2001. Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2004) use an elasticity of 2 while Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ (2000) used a value of 6. Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2004) use a weight on domestic tradeable of 0.7. But they also assume a
share of expenditure on non-tradeable equal to 0.75. This corresponds to a share of domestic consumption on domestic goods
γ of 0.925, not far from our 0.9.
31Figure 8: A Collapse in gE in the two-good model
Finally, Figure 9 presents the case of an unexpected reversal in gE back to g after ten years. The increase
in gE is now associated with a sharp reversal of the current account deﬁcit in U and a depreciation of its
currency at t = 10, but followed by a gradual appreciation so that by year 25, U’s exchange rate is at 1.02
rather than the 1.06 in Figure 8. The purpose of this ﬁgure is to highlight that in our setup there can be
a sharp reversal in the current account and exchange rate, but this would stem from a fundamental shock,
and not from the exogenous and spontaneous correction of an “anomaly,” as the conventional view would
have it.
32Figure 9: A Collapse in gE in the two-good model, followed by a reversal at t = 10
334.3 A U − R World
Consider now the interaction between U and R. As before, let’s consider a scenario where R’s ability to
capitalize ﬁnancial assets drops from δ to δ
R < δ while gR = g.
Following the same steps as before, we obtain:
Vt = Wt =
Xt
θ
where Xt = XU
t + qR
t XR
t , Vt = V U
t + V R
t and Wt = WU
t + WR













− θ(δ − δ
R)
 
which is similar to equation (16), except for the rate of change of the terms of trade.
Since output growth is the same in both countries, a reasoning similar to the previous section implies
that ˙ qR
t /qR
t = 0 asymptotically. The absence of relative supply eﬀect implies that the long run terms of trade
are stable. On impact, however, the relative demand eﬀect is still present: the decline in δ
R reduces the
value of R’s ﬁnancial assets which, under portfolio home bias, reduces R’s ﬁnancial wealth. Finally, due to
consumption home bias, the decline in ﬁnancial wealth in R reduces disproportionately the relative demand
for R’s good and induces a decline in qR.
Asymptotically, substituting ˙ qR
t /qR
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∞, U runs a permanent current account deﬁcit.
The results of Proposition 2 carry through with one exception: the asymptotic output share xU
∞ may
diﬀer from the initial output share xU
0 . It is immediate that the current account deﬁcit will be larger if
r+














, this is equivalent to qR
∞ > qR
0 or λ∞ > λ0. If the real exchange rate depre-
ciates asymptotically, which it does in our simulations, the asymptotic current account worsens, compared
to the single good case.
The conventional rebalancing channel has implications for exchange rate movements but does not aﬀect
the core story for capital ﬂows, which lies somewhere else in global asset markets.22 In fact, although small
for our calibrated parameters, adding the exchange rate dimension allows U to run larger asymptotic current
account deﬁcits and hold larger net foreign liabilities. The reason is that the long run depreciation reduces
U’s share of output (xU
∞). This is equivalent to a further reduction in the global supply of assets and pushes
world interest rates lower (Panel C), reducing U’s borrowing costs.
Figure 10 presents the results of a simulation similar to Figure 5. Panel E demonstrates that the real
exchange rate appreciates on impact by 17 percent, then depreciates slowly, returning to λ0− in 12 years,
then depreciating by another 3.5 percent. Given the previous discussion, the long run depreciation of the real
exchange rate implies that the asymptotic current account deﬁcits are (slightly) larger than in the single good
model (-2.96 percent versus -2.85 percent in the single good model) with a correspondingly higher permanent
accumulation of net foreign liabilities (99% of output versus 95%). Panel C shows that our conclusion with
respect to the decline in interest rates from the single good model remains largely unchanged.
Finally, Figure 11 documents the paths when δ
R returns unexpectedly to δ at t = 10. Comparing Figures
10 and 11, we observe that when δ
R jumps, U’s current account deﬁcit turns around and its real exchange
rate depreciates, and then appreciates slowly. The latter comes with a rapid de-cumulation of claims on U
by R residents (panel D). Again, the point of this ﬁgure is that for these sharp reversals to take place, there
must be a reversal of the causes that triggered the initial shift, since the strength of automatic rebalancing
forces is tenuous at best.
4.4 The Three Regions World
For completeness, we conclude this section by integrating the three regions. The results are as expected,
with the additional insight that since a crash in δ
R has a disproportionate eﬀect on V U relative to V E
when gE < g, and, given ﬁnancial home bias, on WU, at impact U’s currency appreciates not only vis-a-vis
R’s currency but also vis-a-vis E’s currency (due to consumption-home-bias). However, this eﬀect is small
relative to the depreciation of R exchange vis-a-vis both U and E.
Figure 12 reports the bilateral real exchange rates between U, E and R. We start the economy in a
symmetric equilibrium (gi = g and δ
i = δ), with xU
0 = xE
0 = 0.425 and xR
0 = 0.15.23 We then reduce E’s
22The rebalancing channel refers to the mechanism whereby the rapid accumulation of claims on U by R residents, together
with the consumption home bias assumption requires a future a depreciation of the real exchange rate.
23We also assume that the home good preferences are such that γii = 0.9, γij = 0.05 for i  = j.
35Figure 10: A Collapse in δ
R in the two-good model
growth at t = 0. This leads to an immediate appreciation of U′s real exchange rate, as in section 4.2. Then,
at t = 5, we decrease δ
R so that V R decreases by 50%. The ﬁgure conﬁrms our intuition: the crash in δ
R
increases V U/V E, which increases the relative demand for good U and appreciates U′s real exchange rate
relative to E by 2%.
5 Final Remarks
In this paper we have proposed a framework to analyze the eﬀects of diﬀerent structural shocks on global
capital ﬂows, portfolio shares and interest rates. The framework highlights the connection between a region’s
36Figure 11: A Collapse in δ
R in the two-good model, followed by a reversal at t = 10
relative fundamentals – in particular, its growth potential and the quality (or acceptance) of its ﬁnancial
assets – and its ability to produce ﬁnancial assets for global savers.
We used the framework to discuss two shocks that we view as particularly relevant in explaining recent
“global imbalances” and the “interest rate conundrum.” The ﬁrst one is a sustained growth slowdown in E;
The second one is a collapse in the capacity to generate assets in R. The former captures well the eﬀect of
a relative slowdown in the Euro area and Japan. The second captures aspects of the Japanese bubble crash
in the early 1990s and the developments in much of emerging markets and newly industrialized economies of
Asia in the aftermath of the Asian and Russian crises at the end of the 1990s. We also explored the global
eﬀects of the interaction between R’s limited ﬁnancial markets and its fast potential growth. All these eﬀects
37Figure 12: Bilateral Real Exchange Rates in the U-E-R model. Collapse in gE at t = 0 followed by a collapse
in δ
R at t = 5
point in the same direction: To a sustained reallocation of savings toward U and to lower interest rates.
The framework is ﬂexible enough to explore a variety of experiments and issues that have been postulated
in the “global imbalances” debate. For example, a dimension we did not develop in the main text but is
trivial to analyze is that of an increase in a regions’ saving propensity (for example, a decline in θ
R). The
implications would be similar in terms of the path of capital ﬂows, measured saving rates, interest rates and
the interaction with fast growth in R, as those following a crash in δ
R. However the implications would be
entirely diﬀerent for V R: While a drop in δ
R comes with an initial crash in R’s asset prices, an increase in
the propensity to save does the opposite. This distinction is important since the dramatic acceleration in
capital ﬂows toward the US in the late 1990s from R came with a crash rather a rise in asset values in R.
This is not to say that a drop in θ
R is not part of the story, as it is a convenient short-cut to represent the
more recent increase in saving rates by commodity producing economies (which have come with high local
asset prices) or even to capture demographic factors. Moreover, such drop further strengthens the downward
pressure on long rates when combined with fast growth in R. However, in terms of timing it is the crash in
δ
R that most likely started the massive ﬂows from R to U.
Note also that in the model of Section 3, a crash in δ
R naturally leads to a domestic investment slump
in R, as the return on projects not implemented by U or E falls. This is yet another implication that goes
well with the facts, as the investment slump story is one that is used often to explain low real interest rates
and capital ﬂows to U.
One could also model some of the aspects of ﬁscal deﬁcits in the US as an increase in θ
U. This would
indeed lead to current account deﬁcits in U but it would increase rather than reduce interest rates, and
38hence it is probably not the main factor behind current “global imbalances.”
Similarly, one could model the process of globalization as one in which regions are gradually allowed to
participate in global capital markets. In that case, one could generate a downward trend in global interest
rates as low δ
R economies are integrated. This probably accounts for some of the downward pressure
observed on rates since the 1990s.
Finally, a word of caution. Our framework also highlights that the current conﬁguration of global asym-
metries is likely to continue building the already large net external liabilities of U. Leverage always comes
with risks. We have already illustrated within our framework how a reversal in the relative growth advantage
of U vis-a-vis E, or in R’s ﬁnancial underdevelopment (perhaps the most likely reversal channel), would
lead to a sharp reversal in capital ﬂows, interest rates and exchange rates. One could also go outside the
model and add a credit-risk concern with U’s liabilities and generate a more harmful reversal. Our model
has little to say about the latter possibility, although it seems remote. Moreover, one of our main points
has been that such risk does not follow as an unavoidable outcome of the current scenario, as the latter is
consistent with current global asymmetries in growth potential and ﬁnancial development.
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0 (rs−θ)ds = 0
when g < r < g + θ.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3


























t = ˙ Wi
t − ˙ V i
t
= (1 − δ)Xi
t − θWi
t + rtWi
t − ˙ V i
t
= (1 − δ)Xi
t − θWi
t + rt(Wi
t − V i












A.3 The role of assumption 4
Suppose that assumption 4 does not hold. This appendix shows that the essence of our analysis is not
aﬀected by this change, although the expressions are less friendly, if we are willing to make the minimal
assumption that gE > 0, so that g > (1 − δ)θ if Assumption 4 does not hold.
42Let xu
t ≡ XU
t /Xtbe the relative size of country U’s endowment. Since XU
0 = XE










It will prove useful to compute
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0 xu


































Note that we can express rt =
˙ Xt
Xt + δθ as
rt = δθ + gE + xU
t
 
g − gE 
Solving forward the diﬀerential equation for V E














































































We can also solve the diﬀerential equation for WE
t and WU




















































































































































































t→∞ (g − (1 − δ)θ)e(g−(1−δ)θ)t  
WE



















t→∞ −(g − (1 − δ)θ)e(g−(1−δ)θ)t  
WE
























Therefore, the trade balance is positive while income ﬂows are negative (and larger in absolute value than
the trade balance), as in the main text.
A.4 Proof of proposition 3
The ﬁrst inequality of the ﬁrst statement follows directly from (δ−δ
R) > 0, as in Proposition 2. The second
inequality follows from the fact that xU
t declines over time. Asymptotically, rt converges to rR
aut.
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(g + θ − r+)(r+ − g)
< 0







R) (see (18)). From assumption 5, r+ > rR
aut and the second statement
in the proposition now follows since
r − rU
aut
(g + θ − r)(r − g)
=
1 − δ




is increasing with respect to r.
A.5 The U − E − R model
In this case the equations describing the dynamics of each country’s wealth are
45˙ WU
t = −θWU













which aggregate to the following diﬀerential equation for global wealth
˙ Wt =
 








Xt + (rt − θ)Wt (29)
Similarly, the asset pricing equations for each country’s tree are
rtV U
t = δXU









t + ˙ V R
t











Xt + ˙ Vt (30)
As usual, investment equals savings in the world market:
Wt = Vt (31)

















t gU + xE
t gE + xR
t gR + θ
 
δ(1 − xR











t (gR + δ
Rθ)
Hence the world interest rate is a average of gU + δθ, gE + δθ and gR + δ
Rθ with weights given by the
relative size of the endowment of each country.
46A.6 Proof of proposition 4
Deﬁne r∞ the asymptotic interest rate. rR
aut ≤ r∞ < rU



























































































That is, the long run proportional increase in the value of assets following a collapse in δ
R is larger in U than
in E. The results on the current account follow immediately from its deﬁnition and the fact that asymptotic
wealths are less sensitive than initial wealth to interest rate changes.
A.7 Investment and gross ﬂows
We need to distinguish between the old trees (with δ
R) and the new trees. Deﬁne vRo
t the value of an old R
tree, vRn
t the value of a new R tree and vU
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t − gnV U
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Finally, deﬁne the aggregate value of the old trees in R as V Ro
t = NR
0 vRo




t + ˙ V Ro
t













Let’s now consider wealth accumulation equations:
˙ WU
t = (rt − θ)WU
t + (1 − δ)XU
t + gnV U
t + gnNR
t vRn
t − Pt − It
˙ WR
t = (rt − θ)WR

























Now equate W = V and infer
θWt = Xt (1 − κ)
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As for aggregate output growth, we have
˙ Xt
Xt
= gn + gz
so that:
























The last term makes clear that the interest rate will initially be lower with FDI.
The reason is that gn  




> gnVt so the asset demand in U increases more when there is
FDI. This depresses even more interest rates.
48Asymptotically, the last term disappears (since vRn
t and vRo
t grow at rate gz while X grows at rate g)
and xRo
t tends to 0, so that









t , we have:
rt ≤ r∞
The solution for the interest rate requires that we feed in a solution for the asset values vRn
t and vRo
t .























R/δ and we obtain:










































t + rtV Ro
t (36)
What complicates the problem is that the equilibrium interest rate depends upon the current value of
V Ro
t /XRo
t which in turn depends upon the entire sequence of future interest rates.
To solve this problem, deﬁne ˆ vRo








= (rt − gz) ˆ vRo
t − δ
R
and the interest rate can be expressed in terms of ˆ vRo
t and xRo
t as:























If we note further that xRo











































So we can start at ∞ with xRo very close to 0 and ˆ vRo = ˆ vRo
∞ then move ‘back’ in time until xRo = xRo
0 .
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A.8 Solving the Model with Exchange Rates
We use a shooting algorithm to solve for the initial terms of trade qi
0+ and asset values V i
0+ after the shock.
Deﬁne wt = WU
t /XU





t. The system (wt,xt,qi
t) satisﬁes:
˙ wt = (rt − θ − g)wt + (1 − δ) (37)
1 = θγwtP
U(σ−1)









˙ xt = xt (1 − xt)
 


















Equation (37) is the wealth dynamics for country i. Equation (38) is the equilibrium condition on the market
for good U. Equation (39)characterizes the law of motion of relative output. Unlike the one-good model,
the path for future interest rates depends upon the future sequence of terms of trade, which depends upon
the current and future asset values.
We start with a guess for the asset values V i
0+ immediately after the shock. Given the initial portfolio
allocation, we infer the initial wealth distribution Wi
0+. We then use (38) to solve for the initial terms of
trade q0+. Finally, we integrate (37)-(40) forward to construct the path of future interest rates and terms of

























to update our guess for V i




i is the average (time-varying) capitalization ratio.
A.9 “Calibration”
This section discusses the choice of parameters underlying Figures 3-12. The ‘calibration’ of the model
requires parameter values for δ, θ, g, x0, αiU
0 , αUi
0 , (g − gE) and (δ − δ
R). We chose to assign parameters
approximately based on US aggregate data. Table 1 summarizes our parameter assumptions.








V R |t=0 (g − gE) (δ − δ
R)
Value 0.25 3% 0.12 0.5 0.3 0.05 0 -0.5 1.11% 0.07
Table 1: Main Parameters
According to (4), we should think of θ as the output to ﬁnancial wealth ratio, X/W. We obtain an
estimate of W as the net ﬁnancial worth of the household sector. According to the US Flow of Funds, it is
equal to $48.52 trillion in 2004.24 With a US GDP of $11.73 trillion in 2004, this implies θ = 11.73
48.53 ∼ 0.24.
In the simulations, we round this parameter to 0.25. Average output growth in the U.S. between 1950 and
2004 equals 3.33%. We round this number and set the growth rate g to 3 percent. Finally, we assume a
value of raut equal to 6%. This implies a value of δ of (r − g)/θ = 0.12. 25
We now turn to the output shares. We deﬁne U as the U.S., the U.K. and Australia. These countries are
good asset suppliers, and experienced robust growth in the past decade. We identify E with developed non-
oil producing countries with sound ﬁnancial markets, but a lackluster growth performance. Accordingly, we
deﬁne E as countries from the European Union (less the UK), Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, and Switzerland.
Finally, we identify R with developing and oil producing countries with a good income growth potential, but
limited asset production capacity.26
24See the Balance Sheet Table B100, line 42 of the September 2005 release.
25Another possible way to calibrate δ is to observe that in steady state, the P/E ratio is V/δX = 1/δθ. The P/E ratio for the
S&P 500 averages 18.2 for the period 1950-2005.(see Robert Shiller’s webpage at http://www.econ.yale.edu/˜shiller/data.htm).)
This yields δ = 0.22,. This value of δ would imply a risk free rate of 8% which we view as too high. Since not all assets in the
economy are capitalizable, we prefer our estimate of δ.
26The list includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, Hong-Kong, India, Indonesia,
Korea, Mexico, Malaysia, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Singapore, Thailand and Venezuela. Output
data for Poland and Russia starts in 1990.

















Lastly, we assume that the initial portfolio share for U-trees equals the share of US assets in ROW
ﬁnancial wealth, as estimated in ﬁgure 1(c). We adopt an initial value of 0.05. Figure 1(c) is constructed as
the ratio of US gross external liabilities (from the BEA’s US International Investment Position) to the Rest
of the World’s ﬁnancial wealth. To estimate the latter, we calculate the ratio of ﬁnancial wealth to output
for the US, the EU and Japan between 1982 and 2004.28 We ﬁnd a GDP weighted average of 2.48. We
apply this ratio to the Rest of the World GDP. For 2004, we estimate a ﬁnancial wealth of $72 trillion for












































We now describe the parameters for our shocks. We set the decline in E’s growth rate, (g−gR) = 1.11%.
According to the WDI, E’s average growth rate between 1980 and 1992 was 2.73% and only 1.63% between
1992 and 2003 (ppp-adjusted).
27We use GDP data in current dollars from the World Development Indicators.
28Sources: US: Flow of Funds, Table B100 line 8, household ﬁnancial assets; EU: Table 3.1 of the ECB Bulletin, ﬁnan-
cial and capital account of the non ﬁnancial sector; Japan: Flow of Funds, households total ﬁnancial assets, available at
http://www.boj.or.jp/en/stat/stat f.htm.
29According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the US had a zero net foreign asset position in 1988.
52We calibrate the decline in δ
R so that it matches the decline in asset values around the time of the Asian
crisis. From Section 2.3, R’s assets price drops from V R
0− = XR















is the world capitalization index. Hence the drop in asset values at t = 0 is
∆V R
V R |t=0 = δ
R/¯ δ − 1 < 0.

























The decline in dollar asset values was 37 percent in Hong-Kong, 75 percent in Korea and 83 percent in
Indonesia.30 We conservatively consider a decline of 50 percent. This implies:
(δ − δ
R) = 0.07; δ
R = 0.05
30We calculated the decline between July 1997 and January 1998 of the Hang Sen Composite Index (Hong Kong), the KOSPI
(Korea) and the Jakarta Stock Index (Indonesia). All price indices were converted into dollars using daily exchange rates.
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